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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
ADAMSON v. RICKETTS: APPLYING 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO PLEA BARGAIN 
AGREEMENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Adamson v. Ricketts 11,1 the Ninth Circuit held that 
double jeopardy principles prohibit a state from refiling original 
criminal charges in circumstances where the trial court accepted 
a plea agreement and had sentenced the defendant, even if sub-
sequently the defendant intentionally breached the agreement. S 
Because the court in Adamson II found that the defendant had 
made no knowing waiver of his double jeopardy rights, II the de-
fendant's sentence after his retrial on the more serious first-de-
gree murder charge was a violation of the Fifth Amendment. 4 
Thus, the plea bargained second degree murder conviction and 
resulting sentence was reinstated. II The court also held that a 
.criminal defendant has a right to assert a reasonable interpreta-
tion of a plea bargain agreement that differs from the state's 
interpretation. e 
An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed a district 
court decision denying the defendant's writ of habeas corpus.' 
1. 789 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1986) (en bane) (per Ferguson, J.; the other panel members 
were Boochever, J., Hug, J., Nelson, J., Norris. J., Pregerson, J., Schroeder, J.; Kennedy, 
J., dissenting; and Brunetti, J., dissenting, joined by Alarcon, J., Beezer, J., and Ken-
nedy, J.), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3188 (U.S. Sept. 30, 1986) (No. 86-6). An earlier 
Ninth Circuit opinion affirming the denial of habeas corpus is referred to in this Note as 
Adamson v. Ricketts I. See infra note 8. 
2. Id. at 730. 
3.ld. 
4. See infra note 35. 
5. Id. at 730-31. 
6. Id. at 729. 
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The district court decisions had been upheld by a preVIOUS 
Ninth Circuit decision.1I 
II. FACTS 
On June 2, 1976, a bomb exploded in a car occupied by Ari-
zona investigative reporter Don Bolles, resulting in his death 
eleven days later.lo At the time of his death, Bolles was investi-
gating organized crime in Phoenix. Prior to his death, Bolles 
made statements implicating Adamson in the bombing.ll Adam-
son was later arrested and charged with murder.u 
In January 1977, Adamson and the state entered into a plea 
agreement.13 In return for testifying against two other individu-
als, Adamson would plead guilty to second degree murder and 
receive a sentence of 48-49 years in state prison, with actual in-
carceration time to be 20 years, 2 months.14 The Superior Court 
accepted the agreement, and for the next three years Adamson 
cooperated with authorities.l& 
The other two people linked with the bombing were Max 
Dunlap and James Robison.l• Adamson testified at their joint 
trial for murder and conspiracy, stating that he was hired by 
Dunlap and that Robison was the one who actually detonated 
8. Adamson v. Ricketts I, 758 F.2d 441, 452-54 (9th Cir. 1985). The district court 
findings are appendixed to the Ninth Circuit decision. Id. 
9. Id. at 452. The court denied the defendant's petition for habeas corpus by hold-
ing that, although hearsay statements were improperly admitted at trial, the error was 
harmless. Id. at 447-48; the Arizona death penalty statute (AlUz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-
703 E. (1978» was not unconstitutional or arbitrarily applied in the case, Adamson v. 
Ricketts I, 758 F.2d at 448-49; the record supported the imposition of the death penalty, 
Id. at 450; and the defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, Id. at 449-50. 
10. Arizona v. Dunlap, 125 Ariz. 104, 105, 608 P.2d 41, 42 (1980). Some of the facta 
here are recounted from this case reversing the conviction of Max Dunlap. See infra text 
accompanying note 20. 
11. Arizona v. AdBnlSOn, 136 Ariz. 250, 253, 665 P.2d 972. 975 (1983), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 865 (1983). In affirming AdBnlSOn's retrial for first degree murder and the re-
sulting death sentence, the court enumerated the factual history in some detail to sup-
port its finding that the murder was accomplished in an "especially cruel manner." Id. at 
988. 
12. Id. at 975. 
13. Adamson v. R :ketts n, 789 F.2d at 724. The actual agreement is included 8!1 
Appendix A of the decision. Id. See infra test accompanying note 74. 
14.Id. 
15.Id. 
16. Arizona v. Dunlap. 125 Ariz. at 105, 608 P.2d at 42. 
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the bomb after Adamson had placed it under Bolles' car.17 Both 
Dunlap and Robison were convicted and sentenced to 29-30 year 
prison terms on the conspiracy count and given the death pen-
alty on the murder count. 18 
While the Dunlap and Robison convictions were on appeal, 
Adamson was sentenced, upon the state's motion, in December 
1978 by the Superior Court to the agreed term of 48-49 years.1' 
In February 1980, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed the con-
victions of Dunlap20 and RobisonSl and remanded the cases for 
new trials.22 
When the state approached Adamson regarding further tes-
timony, Adamson informed the state that he had met his plea 
bargained obligations by testifying at the first trial but would be 
willing to testify at the Dunlap and Robison retrials in return for 
additional consideration.ss hi April 1980, the state sent Adam-
son's attorney a letter stating that Adamson's refusal to testify 
would be considered a breach of the plea agreement and may 
result in prosecution for first degree murder and other charges 
not previously discussed as part of the plea agreement. S4 
At the pretrial hearing a few days later, Adamson repeated 
his prior testimony but asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege 
when questioned about another ~rime.211 Consequently, the state 
17. Id. 
18.ld. 
19. AdllDlSOn v. Ricketts II. 789 F.2d at 724. 
20. Arizona v. Dunlap. 125 Ariz. at 104. 608 P.2d at 41. The court reversed and 
remanded the convictions oC Dunlap and Robison (lfee infra note 21) because the trial 
court permitted the stata's key witness, Adamson, to invoke the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege several times during cross examination and yet reCused to strike AdaDlSOn's direct 
testimony. Arizona v. Dunlap. 125 Ariz. at 106-07. 608 P.2d at 43-44. The court held that 
this violated the deCendants' Sixth and Fourteenth rights by robbing them oC their right 
to confrontation and cross examination. Id. 
21. Arizona v. Robison. 125 Ariz. 107. 608 P.2d 44 (1980). 
22. Arizona v. Dunlap. 125 Ariz. at 107. 608 P.2d at 44. Arizona v. Robison, 125 Ariz. 
at 111. 608 P.2d at 48. 
23. AdaDlSOn v. Ricketts II. 789 F.2d at 733-34. Adamson sought, inter alia. immedi-
ate release upon completion of the retrial testimony. relocation to a non-jail facility dur-
ing the retrials. protection Cor himself and his family until his release, assistance in relo-
cating and re-establishing a new identity outside of Arizona, and granting of immunity 
Cor all other past crimes. Id. 
24. Adamson v. Ricketts II. 789 F.2d at 734-35. 
25. Id. at 724-25. 
3
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recharged Adamson with first degree murder. Adamson unsuc-
cessfully challenged this new information by Special Action to 
the Arizona Supreme Court.26 Adamson's offer at this point to 
accept the state's interpretation of the plea agreement and to 
cooperate fully was refused.21 Adamson unsuccessfully sought 
habeas corpus review through the federal district court.n After 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial,u Adamson 
was convicted of first, degree murder and sentenced to death.so 
After exhausting all state remedies,sl Adamson's second petition 
for habeas corpus review was denied. S2 This denial was upheld 
by the Ninth CircuitSS but was vacated after an en bane hearing 
by the Ninth Circuit giving rise to the present decision. S4 
III. BACKGROUND 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
states, inter alia, that no person shall "be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."s5 The policy 
26. Id. at 725. The state's information charging Adamson with first degree murder 
was upheld in Adamson v. Super. Ct. of Arizona, 125 Ariz. 579, 611 P.2d 932 (1980). The 
Arizona State Supreme Court held that "[allthough the plea agreement does not specifi-
cally spell out the duration of petitioner's obligation, it. does contemplate full compliance 
with the requests of the state until the objectives have been accomplished." Adamson v. 
Super. Ct. of Arizona, 125 Ariz. at 583, 611 P.2d at 936. The court found that Adamson 
breached the plea agreement and, additionally, had waived any double jeopardy defense. 
Adamson v. Super. Ct. of Arizona, 125 Ariz. at 583-84, 611 P.2d at 936-37. 
27. Adamson v. Ricketts II, 789 F.2d at 725. 
28. Id. This unpublished decision upheld the district court's denial of Adamson's 
petition. 
29. Adamson v. Ricketts II, 789 F.2d at 725. 
30.ld. 
3!. Arizona v. Adamson, 136 Ariz. at 267, 665 P.2d at 989. 
32. Adamson v. Ricketts I, 758 F.2d at 452-54. 
33. Id. at 452. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
34. Adamson II, 789 F.2d at 725. The issues raised by Adamson to the Ninth Circuit 
were that (1) the Confrontation Clause was violated when the trial court permitted ad-
mission of certain evidence, Id., (2) his right to jury trial was infringed upon when the 
court determined the eligibility of the death penalty,ld., (3) the Arizona death penalty 
statute was unconstitutionally vague, Id., (4) there was prose..-utorial or judicial vindic-
tiveness, Id., (5) the Eighth Amendment prohibition against "cruel and unUsual" punish-
ment was violated by Arizona's statute requiring an automatic death sentence if aggra-
vating circumstances are present, Id., and (6) the first degree murder prosecution after 
Adamson's guilty plea and conviction for second degree murder violated the prohibition 
against double jeopardy. ld. 
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally Criminal Procedure: Double Jeopardy, 
ANN. SURV. OF AM. LAw, Mar. 1986, at 309-24; Note, The Burden of Proof in Double 
Jeopardy Claims, 82 MICH. L. REv. 365-86, (1983); Cantrell, Double Jeopardy and Multi-
4
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underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the govern-
ment from subjecting a defendant to "[the] embarrassment, ex-
pense and ordeal [of multiple trials] and compelling him to live 
in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity [reducing any 
chance of rehabilitation], as well as enhancing the possibility 
that even though innocent he may be found guilty."as The courts 
have recognized that states generally have much greater re-
sources and power to sustain multiple prosecutions than a de-
fendant has to sustain a defense through such multiple 
prosecutions.37 
The Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates three separate 
guarantees: It prohibits the government from retrying the de-
fendant after an acquittal, retrying the defendant after a convic-
tion in the hope of obtaining a greater sentence, or punishing 
the defendant more than once for the same offense.38 The prohi-
bition against double jeopardy has been held to extend to all 
crimes.3e The Supreme Court, in Benton v. }..faryland,40 found it 
to be "fundamental to the American scheme of justice"41 and 
thus applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.42 
The fundamental test for whether a second prosecution is 
barred by double jeopardy was first stated in Blockburger v. 
U.S.43 Here the Court stated that "where the same act or trans-
action constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provi-
pie Punishment: An historical and constitutional analysis. 24 S. TEx. L.J. 735-72 
(1983). 
36. Green v. United States. 355 U.S. 184. 187·88. The Court held here that Green 
could not be tried for first degree murder after he had already been convicted of second 
degree murder. Green had appealed his conviction. which was then reversed and reo 
manded.Id. 
37. Id. at 187. 
38. IIIinoi3 v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410. 415 (1979). (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 
U.S. 711. 717 (1969». The Court here discussed the application of the Blockburger test 
(see infra note 43 and accompanying text) in examining whether a prosecution for invol· 
untary manslaughter was precluded by a prior conviction for the offense of failing to 
reduce speed to avoid an accident. Id. 
39. Ex parte Lange. 85 U.S. 163 (1873). 
40. 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
41. Benton. 395 U.s. at 794. 
42. Id. 
43. 284 U.S. 299 (1931). The Court affirmed the conviction of the defendant for sell· 
ing morphine under two separate counts where each offense required the proof of a dif· 
ferent element. Id. at 303·04. 
5
Hom: Criminal Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1987
82 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:77 
sions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two 
offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of 
an additional fact which the other does not."" In Blockburger, 
the SU.preme Court upheld convictions for two separate offenses 
arising from a single sale of illegal drugs where each count re-
quired proof of a different element.46 
Implicit in the constitutional prohibition against prosecu-
tjon for the same offense is the concept of finality protecting the 
defendant from multiple prosecution~!e Otherwise, prosecutors 
would be encouraged to reprosecute until the maximum penalty 
is obtained." 
Before a defendant can raise a double jeopardy defense, 
jeopardy must have attached to the first prosecution. Jeopardy 
is normally said to attach at trial once the jury is empanelled 
and sworn.4S In a non-jury trial, jeopardy attaches when the 
court begins to hear the evidence.'" In the majority of jurisdic-
tions, double jeopardy is held not to apply when a defendant has 
pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense pursuant to a plea 
bargain. ISO However, there is authority to the contrary, prohibit-
ing the governm~nt from reprosecuting for a greater offense.lSl In 
U.S. v. Vaughn,1S2 the Ninth Circuit stated that when a defend-
ant opts to forego a jury trial and instead pleads guilty to a 
44. Id. at 304. 
45. Id. at 302·05. The defendant was convicted for violating § 1 (selling of forbidden 
drugs except in the originally stamped packages) and § 2 (selling drugs not in pursuance 
of a written order) of the Harrison Narcotic Act. Id. 
46. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971). 
47. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606 (1976). 
48. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978). Here, the Supreme Court held that "the fed· 
eral rule that jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury is empaneled and swr.rn ••• 
is an integral part of the Fifth Admendment guarantee against double jeopardy ..• Id. 
at 28. 
49. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975). See generally J. Sigler, DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY 39·47 (1969) for a general discussion of when jeopardy attaches. 
so. Ward v. Page, 424 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 917 (1970). A 
lesser included offense is "one which is necessarily established by proof of the greater 
offense." Fuller v. United States, 407 F.2d 1199, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 
U.S. 1120 (1969). 
51. Mullreed v. Kropp, 425 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1970). The defendant pleaded guilty 
pursuant to a plea agreement to a lesser charge of unarmed robbery and was sentenced. 
The conviction was later overturned on a collateral issue. The court here found an im-
plied-acquittal of the greater charge of armed robbery, thus barring the state's attempt 
to reprosecute. Id. at 1101-02. 
52. 715 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1983). 
6
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charged offense, under some circumstances jeopardy attaches 
when the judge accepts the plea. 53 In all cases, double jeopardy 
attachrs when the judgment of conviction and sentence is 
entered. 54 
To interpret the actual meaning behind a plea bargain 
agreement, the majority of courts apply contract law principles 
which dictate that disputes over terms of an agreement are to be 
resolved by objective standards. 55 Prior to Adamson II, the 
Ninth Circuit followed the majority view. 58 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
Although several constitutional issues were raised by the de-
fendant,57 the majority found the double jeopardy question to be 
dispositive of the case and declined to address the other issues. 58 
The court first considered whether a prosecution for first degree 
murder was barred by Adamson's guilty plea and conviction for 
second degree murder, a lesser included offense. 50 It then ana-
lyzed whether Adamson waived any double jeopardy defenses.ao 
The cou..-t found that jeopardy attached when the Arizona 
trial court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced 
Adamson in 1978. al The court held that it was impermissible to 
reprosecute the defendant under the greater charge of first de-
gree murder.a2 The court applied the Blockburger testaa and con-
cluded that "a conviction for second degree murder requires no 
53. ld. at 1376. 
54. United States v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1983). 
55. See United States e% rei. Williams v. McMann, 436 F.2d 103 (2nd Cir. 1970), 
cert. der':ed, 402 U.s. 914 (1971). See generally E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.7-7.15 
for a discussion of the principles of interpreting contracts. 
56. United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1980). The court found that 
although plea bargaining is a matter of criminal jurisprudence, a plea bargain itself is 
contractual in nature and subject to contract law standards, and thus any dispute over 
terms of agreement is to be resolved by objective standards. 
57. Adamson v. Ricketts II, 789 F.2d at 725. 
58. ld. 
59. ld. at 725-27. 
60. ld. at 727-30. 
61. ld. at 726. The court did not decide whether jeopardy attached at the time 
Adamson's guilty plea was accepted. In this case, Adamson's plea was accepted and he 
was actually sentenced. ld. 
62. ld. at 726-27. 
63. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. at 304. 
7
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fact that is not also needed to sustain a first degree murder con-
viction" in Arizona.M The court also emphasized that the state 
recognized that first and second degree murder were not sepa-
rate crimes by classifying them as different degrees of the same 
offense.tlil Consequently, the court held that Adamson's double 
jeopardy rights were violated by the subsequent prosecution for 
first degree murder.66 
The court then addressed the issue of whether Adamson 
waived his double jeopardy rights in the plea agreement.tl7 The 
court analogized the double jeopardy protection to other simi-
larly situated constitutional rights,ea concluding that any waivers 
must be made voluntarily, knowingly, intelligent!y,ee and ex-
pressly.70 Here, the court found no knowing and intelligent 
waiver: Adamson's actions in accepting the terms of the plea 
agreement, which the state contended constituted a waiver, were 
not taken with the knowledge that in so doing, he was waiving 
his double jeopardy rights.71 
The court stated that Adamson reasonably believed that a 
refusal to testify did not constitute a breach of the agreement.72 
The court so held even though Adamson's counsel previously ac-
knowledged that his client might be prosecuted on a first degree 
murder charge should the Attorney General's office succeed in 
withdrawing the plea agreement." 
64. Adamson v. Ricketts II, 789 F.2d at 727. 
65.ld. 
SS.ld. 
67. Id. at 727-30. 
68. Id. at 727. See generally United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(waiving the right to a jury trial); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (waiving the 
right to assistance of counsel). 
69. Adamson v. Ricketts II, 789 F.2d at 727 (citing Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 
(1975) and Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1978». 
70. Adamson v. Ricketts II, 789 F.2d at 729. 
71. Id. at 728-29. 
72. Id. at 729. 
73. Id. at 733. The letter dated April 3, 1980 from William Feldhacker, Adamson's 
attorney, to the Assistant Attorney General states: 
John Harvey Adamson is further fully aware of the fact 
that your office may feel that he has not completed his obliga-
tio:lll under the plea agreement in CR-93385 and, further, that 
your office may attempt to withdraw that plea agreement from 
him. He is aware that if the Statu were successful in doing so, 
that he may be prosecuted for the killing of Donald Bolles on 
a first degree murder charge. (Emphasis added.) 
8
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The court found that the language of the plea bargain 
agreement;" was "not clear''7G and was "reasonably"" subject to 
Id. 
74. Id. at 731-32. The relevant sections of Adamson's plea agreement to plead guilty 
to second degree murder in return for testifying against Dunlap and Robison are: 
Id. 
The defendant, John Harvey Adamson, hereby agrees to 
plead guilty to Murder, Second Degree. 
4. The defendant hereby agrees to testify fully and com-
pletely in any CI':.lrt, State or Federal, when requested by 
proper authorities against any and aU parties involved in the 
murder of Don Bolles, and in the beating of Leslie Boros at 
the Sheraton-Scottsdale, Maricopa County, Arizona, and any 
and all parties involved in the crimes listed in Exhibits A and 
B [omitted) •••• 
5. It is agreed by aU parties that the defendant shall tes-
tify truthfully and completely at all times, whether undCl oath 
or not, to the crimes mentioned in this agreement. This shall 
include aU interviews, depositions, hearings and trials. Should 
the defendant refuse to testify or should he at any time testify 
untruthfully or if any material fact in the defendant's tran-
scribed statements given to the State prior to this agreement 
be false, then this ontire agreement is null and void and the 
original charge will be automatically reinstated. The defend-
ant will be subject to the charge of Open Murder, and if found 
guilty of First Degree Murder, to the penalty of death or life 
imprisonment requiring mandatory twenty-five years actual 
incarceration, and the State shall be free to file any charges, 
not yet filed as of the date of this agreement. 
8. All parties to this agreement hereby waive the time for 
sentencing and agree that the defendant will be sentenced at 
the conclusion of his testimony in aU of the cases referred to 
in this agreement • • • • 
17. That the defendant understands the following rights 
and understands that he gives up such rights by pleading 
guilty: 
a. His right to a jury trial; 
b. His right to confront the witnesses against him and 
crOBB-examine them; 
Co His right to present evidence and call witnesses in his 
defense, knowing that the State will compel such witnesses to 
appear and testify; 
d. His right to be represented by counsel (appointed free 
of charge, if he cannot afi'ort [sic) to hire his own) at the tria1 
of the proceedings; and 
e. His right to remain silent, to refuse to be a witness 
against himself, and to be presumed innocent until proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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more than one interpretation. '1'1 Thus, the court held that a re-
linquishment of the double jeopardy defense could not have 
been knowing or intentional. '111 The court found that, at trial, a 
defendant has the right to assert a reasonable construction of an 
agreement that differs from the state's interpretation.'111 To find 
otherwise would force defendants into accepting the state's in-
terpretation in all cases of alleged breach.llo 
The court declined, as "ill-suited"111 and "inappropriate,"112 
to apply pure contract principles to the terms of the plea agree-
ment in interpreting whether Adamson impliedly waived his 
constitutional right against double jeopardy." The court found 
that such principles were more applicable for determining dam-
ages in civil contract litigation, rather than whether a defendant 
waived a constitutional right.'· However, it did apply the general 
maxim of contract construction of interpreting ambiguous lan-
guage in an agreement less favorably against the party that sup-
plied the language.8 & 
In reaching its conclusion, the court noted four actions that 
the government could have taken to ensure performance and to 
bar a successful double jeopardy claim by Adamson: (1) drafted 
the plea bargain agreement more competently," (2) specifically 
stated that Adamson would waive the double jeopardy defense 
and listed the circumstances under which the first degree 
charges would be reinstated," (3) waited until the prosecutions 
of Adamson's co-defendants were completed before having 
Adamson sentenced, SII or (4) called Adamson to testify after he 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 728-29. 
79. Id. at 729. 
80. Id. at 728-29. 
81. Id. at 728. 
82. Id. at 729. 
83. Id. at 728-29. 
84. Id. at 729. 
85. See genera!ly FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS at § 7.11. "An especially common rule of 
construction is that if language supplied by one party is reasonably susceptible to two 
interpretations, one of which favors each party, the one that is less favorable to the party 
who supplied the language is preferred." Id. 
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later agreed to do so.se 
V. CRITIQUE 
Should the United States Supreme Court uphold the deci-
sion in Adamson II, the benefits will extend only to a small class 
of defendants in plea bargain situations. Although ruling in 
favor of Adamson, the Ninth Circuit has clearly stated that had 
the government employed better drafting of the plea bargain 
agreement or timed the events of the case differently, the state 
would have prevailed. eo 
Jeopardy was found to attach when Adamson was sen-
tenced. el In the future, prosecutors may simply wait for final 
sentencing of co-defendants before asking for sentencing of the 
testifying defendant. More likely, because of the amount of time 
needed to reach a final judgment,~2 prosecutors in the future will 
attempt to draft agreements containing an express waiver of a 
double jeopardy claim in the event of a defendant's breach. 
Adamson II will most benefit those defendants who have a 
strong bargaining position and are able to exert a greater influ-
ence over the terms of a plea agreement.es However, in the ma-
jority of cases, the stronger bargaining position remains with the 
-government. e4 
The court refused to find an express waiver of Adamson's 
double jeopardy rights.ell It also did not find an implied waiver 
even though Adamson's attorney admitted that an unsuccessful 
challenge to the terms of the plea agreement may result in pros-
89.ld. 
9O.ld. 
91. ld. at 726. 
92. ld. at 724. Adamson's plea agreement was reached in January 1977. The convic-
tion'.! of Dunlap and Robison were overturned in February 1980. ld. 
93. J. BOND. PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAs § 2.12(a) (2d ed. 1983). (All studies 
indicate the poor, the black, and the "least criminal" defendants get worse "deals" than 
the affluent, the white, and the inveterate criminai defendants.) 
94. See generally J. KLEtN. LJ;;T's MAKE A DEAL 17-20 (1976) for a general discussion 
of the relative bargaining powers of prosecutors and defendants. See also Kipnis, Crimi-
nal Justice and the Negotiated Plea, 86 Ethics 93 (Jan. 1976) (Plea bargaining necessa-
rily entails impermissible coercion.). But cf- Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795, 798-99 
(lst Cir. 1959). 
95. Adamson V. Ricketts II, 789 F.2d at 72:1. 
11
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ecution on a first degree murder charge.96 The court. by placing 
less weight on statements made outside of the plea agreement. 
was consistent in making the actual words in the agreement the 
basis upon which to resolve any disputes in interpretation. 
The Adamson II court noted that a defendant has the right 
to assert a "reasonable'· (emphasis added) construction of a plea 
agreement.I" Unfortunately. this right may be more illusory than 
real. A defendant still faces the danger of a court finding that 
his or her interpretation of an agreement is not reasonable. He 
or she would then be in breach.98 Additionally. should the gov-
ernment. in future plea bargain agreements. retain the right to 
reprosecute on greater charges. a defendant may have the 
"right" to challenge the government's interpretation of the 
agreement but he or she would obviously run great risks in doing 
so. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Adamson II. the Ninth Circuit held that double jeopardy 
principles as applied to a plea bargain agreement prohibited the 
state from refiling original first degree murder charges. The ma-
jor result of the court's decision will be to force prosecutors to 
draft more carefully written plea agreements so as to bar the 
future use of double jeopardy as a possible defense by other 
defendants. 
Jimmy L. Hom* 
96. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
97. Adamson v. Ricketts II, 789 F.2d at 729. 
98. For example, while the panel of the Ninth Circuit found that the agreement was 
"not clear" and "reasonably subject to interpretation," ld. at 729, the Arizona Supreme 
Court previously held that there was a "clear understanding" from the language of the 
same agreement. Adamson v. Super. Ct. of Arizona, 125 Ariz. at 583, 611 P.2d at 936. 
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